Nevin Climenhaga

My research engages a wide variety of topics across epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, and ethics. I have published articles on the nature of knowledge, the nature of probability, the use of probability in historical reasoning, Bayesian measures of confirmation, inference to the best explanation, causal inference, the use of intuitions in philosophy, non-textual narrative in art, infinite value, divine providence and human free will, and the problem of evil. In a current book project, I defend a form of infallibilism about knowledge, according to which we know all and only those propositions that are certain for us. I see knowledge, so understood, as playing a foundational role in determining the rationality of belief and credence, in that we ought to be confident in a given proposition to the extent that it is made probable by what we know. Some other current projects explore the relation of epistemic and physical probability and the role of statistical and character evidence in the law.